Operationally Responsive Space

[Gray Rinehart]

Yesterday the Air Force's TacSat-3 launched from Wallops Island, Virginia, on a Minotaur rocket, according to this SpaceFlight Now story (http://www.spaceflightnow.com/minotaur/tacsat3/).


[It] carries a high-resolution imager and user-friendly software that will attempt to show officials the value of responsive spacecraft to lower-ranking military commanders leading troops on the battlefield....

The 880-pound satellite is managed by the Air Force Research Laboratory at Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M. It is part of the Department of Defense's Operationally Responsive Space program, which aims to develop, test and integrate low-cost space technologies onto tactical battlefields.

As much as I recognize and support the value of space systems to the warfighter, I have not been a fan of ORS as I've understood it. Perhaps it's changed since I was in the service, but I recall the program being advertised in ways that smacked of making promises it couldn't keep.

If anyone has any new information to make me change my mind, I'd appreciate hearing it. And I do look forward to seeing the results (if they're released to the public) from this and other demonstrations.

[Gray Rinehart]

According to this Aviation Week item (http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/UNFUND052009.xml&headline=Comms,%20Jammers%20Top%20USAF%20FY10%20Un funded%20List&channel=defense), Operationally Responsive Space is near the top of the Air Force's current unfunded priorities list.


Third up is a $103.4 million unfunded request for Operationally Responsive Satellite-1 and a follow-on which, until now, was not publicly discussed. ORS-1 is [an] effort to quickly build an infrared imaging satellite to support urgent needs in CentCom; according to [USAF Chief of Staff Norton] Schwartz’s list a shortfall in this capability is projected for the command next fiscal year, which starts Oct. 1.

Such funds would finish development of the first spacecraft and provide for the second satellite, described by Schwartz as a clone of ORS-1. The satellite was expected to be complete within 24 months of contract award and to operate for at least two years. This measure could spark interest from the intelligence community, which typically provides IR imaging capabilities for commanders around the globe.

It seems some folks are convinced of the utility of ORS; I hope the ORS folks aren't making the same promises they made when I first learned about the idea, or I'm afraid a lot of people are going to be disappointed.

[dbergeron]

I worked extensively on the precursor program to TACSAT 3. Warfighter-1 was an 8-meter hyperspectral imager flown on a commercial satellite. We attempted launch 10 days after the 9/11 attacks. Unfortunately, we didn't make it to orbit.

The focus of the program was to attempt to put unfiltered information into the hands of the in-theater analysts and decision-makers. As you know there are priority issues with tasking national assets and you generally do not get the unfiltered data, restricting what can be learned by the people closest to the problem.

One of the arguements has been that the people in the field didn't have the necessary expertise to exploit the data, but having seen the capabilies of the AF, Army & Navy intel analysts, I don't think that particular arguement holds water. They are very capable and innovative.

Hyperspectral is a good technology to test ORS. Because it is computer based exploitation, it minimizes the need to have exploiters with 20+ years of photogrammetry experience.

As I'm sure you know, there tends to be extreme urinary olympics involved in using strategic assets for tactical purposes. ORS is the field commander's attempt to get the information he needs within his decision cycle.

[Gray Rinehart]

You're right: not only are strategic assets not always optimized for tactical use, but the organizational (and even bureaucratic) structures usually aren't flexible enough for efficient information sharing.

I'm all in favor of pumping as much data down to the field commanders as possible, although I have concerns about data and information overload, but the briefings and discussions I heard made it sound as if we were promising commanders that we would launch that spacecraft and they would immediately get real-time data 24/7. Basic orbitology prohibits that, but no one -- and I mean no one -- brought up that fundamental limitation. The message was, "Call us up, we'll launch it, and you'll get the data."

A satellite in orbit can't be as persistent as a UAV (although one of my unpublished nonfiction books includes a chapter describing a method by which it might), yet we seemed to be promising that high a level of persistent coverage. Hopefully, we've backed away from making that promise.

Thanks,
G

[dbergeron]

There was a fair amount of education that we had to do with the folks from ARSPACE, but they catch on pretty quickly. We started by trying to co-opt NASA’s Clark satellite (of Lewis & Clark fame). We built the “Clark Van” that could receive and exploit data from the satellite. We were to get a direct in-theater downlink from the satellite as a precursor to WF-1 tasking of the imager from the theater. Unfortunately, Lewis & Clark were cancelled. ARSPACE took the Clark Van and turned it into a mobile exploitation vehicle.

In a side note, it was interesting to work with the Army folks. They have a different perspective. You really have to be careful what you ask them to do. We told ARSPACE that a letter of support from the Commanding General of ARSPACE and AFSPACE/XP would be helpful in maintaining laboratory funding for the program. Two days later, the GS-13 (Admiral Dick Truly’s daughter-in-law) marched into the XP’s office and asked him to sign the letter. The XP explained that “this is not how it’s done”, but signed the letter anyhow. Her comment to him was, “we don’t have time to wait in the Army”.

[Gray Rinehart]

Or maybe I just understand it better.

As I discuss in detail in my Strategic Space Symposium thread (http://www.graymanwrites.com/forums/showthread.php?t=67), I think I've become a convert to the current concept of ORS. It doesn't seem to be the "call us and we'll launch a satellite just for you!" idea anymore. Maybe it never was; I may have been operating under a misconception all this time. But the idea that we might deploy a constellation of small, modular satellites to support a contingency, in the same way that we would deploy, over a period of time, the other forces to support the contingency, makes much more sense to me.