g.w.
03-25-2003, 02:27 PM
THE FOLLOWING IS A PORTION OF THE ORIGINAL E-MAIL FORUM'S DISCUSSION ON "SPACE TACTICS & STRATEGY."
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SPACE “ACCESS” (another carryover from the "Why Fight in Space?" discussion): What is “access” from the standpoint of space (and maybe information)? We might think of “physical” access as the ability to achieve orbit, or the ability to contact an orbiting platform (considering a stream of RF energy to be a physical touch). In many cases, that type of physical access would be reserved for owner/operators. Others might have “virtual” access, i.e., use of the orbiting platform without ownership or control as in the open use of GPS signals.
Is the difference significant between these two levels of access? Are there other levels of access with which we should be concerned?
KLP: When I think of accessing space assets, I think of passive use (receiving a signal from a GPS satellite) and active use (downloading imagery or using communications). One of the courses I took here at CGSC was Information Operations. That course opened my eyes to the different roles that satellites play in the battlefields of the present and the future. Also space assets are involved in all aspects of the DIME (diplomatic, information, military, economic) instruments of national power for the U.S. As more people come to realize and accept what space assets can enable, the more access to those assets is going to become an issue. One thing I continually zing my Army classmates on is, their generals' fascination with actually being in control of the assets that are provinding them information. In my Space Operations class we had a briefing yesterday from the 1-star in charge of the "space" portion of Army Space Command. He briefed on the Space Support Teams and how all the CINCs and Corps CCs want their own SSTs permanently attached to their units. The Army also has formed a new career field (FA 40) which is an army space operator and they are being assigned (in addition to the SSTs) to Corps/Divisions around the army. The CCs also want their own JTAGGs and any other "boxes that download stuff from those satellites."
All this to say, in the future, as more people become space smart, access is going to be an issue that takes on more importance.
GWR: I particularly like your description of space access as either passive or active. And are you seeing any signs of information overload, or are the fielded forces demanding more and more "access" even though they might not be able to make use of it all?
PROTECTING COALITION SPACE ASSETS (another carryover): Consider what assets the coalition possesses. In order to avoid specifics of the “space order of battle,” it may be enough to note that space assets will either be in LEO (e.g., DMSP), MEO (e.g., GPS), or HEO/GEO (e.g., Milstar, UFO, DSP).
If we are going to protect the assets in these various orbits, we then need to know from what. What are the threats? The first obvious threat, even if difficult to manifest, is physical destruction or disabling by kinetic or directed energy. Second--easier but still not easy--is exploitation. Third, and easiest to accomplish, is denial through destroying or disabling ground stations, launch complexes, etc.
GWR: Consider the following written testimony on “Counter-Space Capabilities” from Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, DIA Director (found at http://www.dia.mil/Public/Press/statement04.html#section_212). “The US reliance on (and advantages in) the use of space platforms is well known by our enemies. Many are attempting to reduce this advantage by developing capabilities to threaten US space assets, in particular through denial and deception, signal jamming, and ground segment attack. A number of countries are interested in or experimenting with a variety of technologies that could be used to develop counter-space capabilities. These efforts could result in improved systems for space object tracking, electronic warfare or jamming, and directed energy weapons. Some countries have across-the-board programs underway, and other states and non-state entities are pursuing more limited – though potentially effective – approaches. By 2010, future adversaries will be able to employ a wider variety of means to disrupt, degrade, or defeat portions of the US space support system.”
Have we left out anything?
____
SPACE “ACCESS” (another carryover from the "Why Fight in Space?" discussion): What is “access” from the standpoint of space (and maybe information)? We might think of “physical” access as the ability to achieve orbit, or the ability to contact an orbiting platform (considering a stream of RF energy to be a physical touch). In many cases, that type of physical access would be reserved for owner/operators. Others might have “virtual” access, i.e., use of the orbiting platform without ownership or control as in the open use of GPS signals.
Is the difference significant between these two levels of access? Are there other levels of access with which we should be concerned?
KLP: When I think of accessing space assets, I think of passive use (receiving a signal from a GPS satellite) and active use (downloading imagery or using communications). One of the courses I took here at CGSC was Information Operations. That course opened my eyes to the different roles that satellites play in the battlefields of the present and the future. Also space assets are involved in all aspects of the DIME (diplomatic, information, military, economic) instruments of national power for the U.S. As more people come to realize and accept what space assets can enable, the more access to those assets is going to become an issue. One thing I continually zing my Army classmates on is, their generals' fascination with actually being in control of the assets that are provinding them information. In my Space Operations class we had a briefing yesterday from the 1-star in charge of the "space" portion of Army Space Command. He briefed on the Space Support Teams and how all the CINCs and Corps CCs want their own SSTs permanently attached to their units. The Army also has formed a new career field (FA 40) which is an army space operator and they are being assigned (in addition to the SSTs) to Corps/Divisions around the army. The CCs also want their own JTAGGs and any other "boxes that download stuff from those satellites."
All this to say, in the future, as more people become space smart, access is going to be an issue that takes on more importance.
GWR: I particularly like your description of space access as either passive or active. And are you seeing any signs of information overload, or are the fielded forces demanding more and more "access" even though they might not be able to make use of it all?
PROTECTING COALITION SPACE ASSETS (another carryover): Consider what assets the coalition possesses. In order to avoid specifics of the “space order of battle,” it may be enough to note that space assets will either be in LEO (e.g., DMSP), MEO (e.g., GPS), or HEO/GEO (e.g., Milstar, UFO, DSP).
If we are going to protect the assets in these various orbits, we then need to know from what. What are the threats? The first obvious threat, even if difficult to manifest, is physical destruction or disabling by kinetic or directed energy. Second--easier but still not easy--is exploitation. Third, and easiest to accomplish, is denial through destroying or disabling ground stations, launch complexes, etc.
GWR: Consider the following written testimony on “Counter-Space Capabilities” from Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, DIA Director (found at http://www.dia.mil/Public/Press/statement04.html#section_212). “The US reliance on (and advantages in) the use of space platforms is well known by our enemies. Many are attempting to reduce this advantage by developing capabilities to threaten US space assets, in particular through denial and deception, signal jamming, and ground segment attack. A number of countries are interested in or experimenting with a variety of technologies that could be used to develop counter-space capabilities. These efforts could result in improved systems for space object tracking, electronic warfare or jamming, and directed energy weapons. Some countries have across-the-board programs underway, and other states and non-state entities are pursuing more limited – though potentially effective – approaches. By 2010, future adversaries will be able to employ a wider variety of means to disrupt, degrade, or defeat portions of the US space support system.”
Have we left out anything?