"Toward Space War"
"Toward Space War" was the title of the article Gray put together with a few other members of the Space Warfare Forum; after floating around from venue to venue, it was finally published in High Frontier, the professional journal of Air Force Space Command.
Unfortunately, the editors at High Frontier didn't go along with Gray's suggestion to have the article by-line read "By the Space Warfare Forum," and his name ended up under the title as "contributed by." But, so we don't miss the opportunity to share the credit, Gray's co-authors on this article were Erik Eliasen, Steve Julian, Mike Lutton, Keith Phillips, John Taylor, Mark Van Voorhis, and James H. Galt-Brown.
The article opened with an historical discussion of space war ...
We do not need to recount all that was written and said about the First Gulf War, e.g., whether or not it represented a revolution in military affairs, how well the space systems worked or how they failed to live up to expectations, etc. Nor do we have to anticipate all that will be written about the second. In the same way that we do not call the US Civil War the first air war, even though observation balloons were used, none of the contributions of space systems to the First Gulf War (or to later actions in Bosnia, Yugoslavia, or the Terror War) meet the commonsense definition of a space war. Neither of the two Gulf Wars involved action against space units or space assets and therefore fall short of a "space war." Absent a contemporary space war, then, we are faced with two possibilities: either the first space war was already fought, or it has yet to be fought.
It also discussed whether it's even important to prepare for space war ...
We have learned how well space assets contribute to terrestrial operations, but that experience only gets us started. If we are not yet ready--organized, trained, equipped, and fielded--to fight a true space war, we must ask whether we should be and if so, when and how to get ready. Should we so prepare? The answer must be yes, unless we are willing to cede that highest ground to others. Those who claim that space can remain a sanctuary free of weapons would ignore history and human nature ....
If we field space weapons, we run the risk that other nations will perceive us as arrogant (too late; they already do) and possibly unite against us; along the way we incur significant cost, but we reap the benefit of improved security at least for a time. If we refuse to develop space weapons, we risk that other nations will develop them in our stead and wrest further control of the "high ground" from us; however, we avoid the cost outlay, and reap the benefit of improved international regard (scant reward at best in the current environment, and which cannot help but be short-lived). Which course of action we advocate depends on whether we are pessimists or optimists about human nature, at least on the international scale.
Indeed, we would be remiss in our duties if we were not thinking about and preparing for space war. History--and warfare--do not look kindly on those who fail to prepare. But prepare against whom?
Who, then, is the enemy? A quick and easy answer is anyone who stands against us in the pursuit of our national aims. Given the national aim of security, our enemies are 1) international terrorists and the organizations/states that support them, 2) nations that have stated their intentions of harming us or our allies, and 3) nations with undeclared intentions but holding both animosity and substantial arsenals. Given the national aim of economic prosperity, our enemies are 1) nations that restrict international trade (although in some cases we are our own worst enemy in this area), 2) nations that (intentionally or not) inhibit development of indigenous industries, and 3) smugglers, pirates, and the like who interrupt trade. Given the national aim of spreading democratic principles of self-rule, our enemies are 1) totalitarian regimes, and 2) semi-democratic but repressive regimes. Putting all this together, we can list our enemies ... but this may not be the place to do so. For the moment, most nations we might list do not possess large numbers of space assets.
Before we stop there, considering as our enemies only those who stand in the way of our achieving our national aims might be too simple. Taking a page from Mahan, the choke points we control, whether we need to control them for our "national aims" or not, are choke points that are not controlled by anyone else, friend or foe. Using the analogy of the coaling station, enough for us is not enough when there are more still available to potential enemies, such as specific orbital tracks, or LaGrange (libration) points, or whatever. On our way to a permanent lunar base, for instance, we might consider establishing and protecting permanent bases at the LaGrange points. Our national aim might be well served by seizing "territory" or planting the flag before anyone else does, simply to maintain our position relative to the balance of power. For a terrestrial example, Great Britain does not need the Falkland Islands anymore but they went to war to protect their interests there.
There's more where that came from, in this direct link to a PDF version of the Winter 2005 issue.